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he labor force by 1933, then declined fairly slowly to a level of about 15 percent in 1940. During the 11-year period fr 'om 1930-40 , it averaged about 18 percent. Charts 2 and 3 show real gross national pr'oduct and the price level (as measured by the implicit GNP deflator) over the same period. Like chku't 1, these charts show a sharp economic contraction beginning in 1930. By 1933, real ON!' had declined to about $140 billion from its level of about $200 billion in 1929, while the price level fell by about 40 percent.
The sharpest recorded c,ontraction in economic activitv that occurred before this episode followed World War I from 1918-21) , and the sponsors of the Full Employment Bill were motivated by the fear' that the end of World War II and the re-entry of discharged war veterans into the civilian labor for'ce would augur a return of the problems of the 1930s. 'Fhe data pr'esented in char'ts 1-3 did riot exist when the bill was debated iii 1945.Ãs a result, the authors of the bill used unofficial estimates of unemployment for years pr'ior to 1942 to bolster their arguments iii favor of the bill's passagc."'l'hese estimates were inserted into the hearings fr'om a book by Henry Wallace that was widely referred to ill the popular press at that time.' 5 1t was not until August of 1942, when the task of estimating unemployment was transferred from the Works Progress Administration to the Census Bureau, that official definitions of "employed" and "unemployed" were developed and consistently applied in periodic surveys of the labor force. See Bancroft (1957) , p. 66 and U.S. Department of Labor (1982 ), p. 3. 'Full Employment Act of 1945 (1 g45), p. 1103 'See Wallace (1945) . 
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Wallace's data, which span the per'iod 1900-44, are reproduced in char-t 4. The chart pn'esents estimates of the labor' for'ce, the level of employment consisLent with ''full'' employment, and the actual level of employment.' The story told by Wallace's gr'aph, which shows a large gap between full and actual employment during the 1930s, is consistent with the more refined data shown in chart 1 Tt1F;O.E~Vot'i:iii~. 1SF ;4,Hy.uE4F~CYCLE:
'Wallace estimates lull employment by subtracting an estimate of frictional unemployment from the labor force. See Wallace ( ), pp. 19-20. 'Wallace (1945 , pp. 20-22. Wallace attributed the abnormally high level of unemployment to "the planlessness of the twenties" and suggested that the system of free enterprise in the United States survived only because of the "bold, courageous action of the Roosevelt New Deal" and then only by the narrowest of margins. Furthermon-e, activity on the London and Wall Street stock exchanges amplified the effect of the changes in the state of confidence on n-cal investment. Keynes suggested that these stock exchanges transformed the extremely important social pr-ocess of din'ecting capi-"Some of the other factors Keynes mentions are "the physical conditions of supply in the capital goods industries the psychological attitude to liquidity and the quantity of money Ibid., p. 248. ' 4 lbid., pp. 149, 153,248,313,316 and 322 . According to Keynes, this tendency for radical change in the state of business confidence is accentuated by such things as the "day-to-day fluctuations in profits (that) tend to have an altogether excessive influence on the market"; "waves of optimistic and pessimistic sentiment"; the "antisocial . . . fetish of liquidity": and "the dark forces of time and ignorance which envelop our future." Ibid., pp. 153-55. tal investment to its most profitable use ''into a bypn'oduct of Ihe activities of a casino....'' While lhe sponsor-s of the Full Employment Bill may not have accepted eveny "jot and little" of Keynes' analysis, they clean-ly believed thaI labor market conditions were too important to be left to the vagaries of a r-oulette wheel.
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(OIFIpF:i\~44'J'1flf9% P1I.NIMYG 'I'he initial draft of the pi-oposed legislation went under' the title of the Full Employment Bill of 1945. This bill proposed to attack the problem of unemplovment in two ways. Section 2)1)) stated that ''all Americans able to work and desiring to work are entitled to an opportunity for' useful, remuner-ative, n-egulai-, arid full-time employment.''" In the view of the sponsors, "Ibid., p. 159. (1945) , p. 81. The proposed legislation used the words "are entitled to" rather than the word "right" but it is clear in the following subsection and in the debates and hearings that the sponsors intended to establish the opportunity to full-time employment as a basic right of all Americans. See, for example, pp. 7-B and 71-80. the conditions necessar for-continuous full employment could not be expected from the system of private enterprise. Consequently, the bill placed the responsibility for the maintenance of ftrll employment on the federal government. Section 2(c) requir-es the feden-al government to "provide such volume of Federal investment and expenditure as may be needed --. to assure continuing full employment."
'Assuring Full Employment in a Free Competitive Economy
Section 3 laid out a formula for the fedelal gover-nment to follow in pursuing this goal. The formula required the President of the United States to submit a national budget to Congress at the heginning of each regular session. The budget was to contain a fom-ecast of both the level of output necessary to gener-ate full employment over the next year and the level of output that was likely to m-esult if gover-nment did not inter--vene. If the projected level of output was less than the "Ibid., p.
81 .
level necessary for full employment, the President was required to recommend legislation that would produce a big enough deficit in the federal government's budget to raise output to the full employment level. If the relationship between the two output fom-ecasts were reversed, the President was required to i-ecornmend legislation that would result in a budget surplus big enough to reduce output to the full employment level."At the time, this method ofstabilizing economic activit was called "compensatory finance.""
1:
One of the important features of the (in-aft legislation was that it put in place the machinery to apply the "Ibid., p. principle of compensatory finance on a continuous basis, year in and year-out. The sponsors believed that a continuous application was necessary because they interpreted Wallace's data as indicating that high levels of unemployment were a natunal consequence of free enterprise.
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As mentioned, a striking feature of Wallace's data is the lan-ge and persistent gap between full employment and actual employment that occurred during the 1930s (see chart 41. The gap averages about 18 percent of the labor force, indicating that a very serious economic problem existed during this period. Wallace, in his book, and the sponsor-s of the Full Employment Bill, during the hearings and debates, focused entirely on this gap.
From the viewpoint ofthe bill's sponsors, these data indicate that the system of private enterprise was prone to sizeable periodic disn-uptions. The congressional debates and hearings ar-c filled with assertions that "the history of employment and production in the United States is a record of boom and bust. It is a record of brief periods of gr-owth and development culminating in peaks of prosperity that gave way to disastrous collapse;" or that "private enterprise, left to its own devices, cannot provide full employment and cannot eliminate pemiodic mass unemployment and economic depressions."
To opponents of the bill, the data suggest that employment behavior during the 1930s was pervem'se by past standards. Indeed, the '30s are noteworthy because the behavior-of unemployment during these years was so unusual." Chart 4 shows that the level of actual employment remained very close to the estimate of full employmerit over the first 30 years of the sample. 't'here were sharp increases in 1908, 1914, and 1921 ; and the gal) was negative during America's involvement in World "Full Employment Act of 1945 ), p. 1181 . In addition, see Assuring Full Employment in a Free Competitive Economy (1945 . "Why the '30s were unusual is still debated and beyond the scope of this paper. The interested reader is referred to Alchian and Allen (1977) pp. 467-80, especially page 477, and Friedman and Schwartz (1963) .
War I." These gaps, however-, quickly vanished so that actual employment was never-much different than full employment for any appreciable length of time.
Opponents of the bill disputed claims that the conditions experienced in the 1930s were a natural consequence of fm-ee enter-pnise." While agreeing that business cycles are inevitable, they ar-gued that economic forces operate to move the economy in the direction of full employment. The opponents suggested that compensatory spending should be applied only in the event of an extn'eme contr-action to limit its depth and duration In addition to this dispute, the debate focused on three specific points: U whether the r-equirement to maintain continuous full employment and price level stability was feasible; 2) whethen-the governnmnent could generate the necessary forecasts; and 3) whether the r-ight to employment should be written into law.
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The opponents thought business cycles were inevitable, and their' consequences, in the form of temporarily meduced employment, could not be legislated away. They ar-gued that business cycles were symptorus of the adjustment process to, say, a nmjor change in consumer demand in favor of some goods but against others, a change that causes pr-oduction costs to m-ise for some goods but fall for' others, or' a change in aggr-egate supply like an unusually good or' bad bar--vest. Any of these changes results in a movement of resources (including labor) fr-or'n one job to another. 'l'he adjustment takes time to complete and, in the interim, unemployment incr-eases.
The proposed bill r-equim-ed the federal government to i-etan-d these necessar adjustments. While the oppomients conceded that ''Govem-nmnent spending can for awhile create full employment as it did during the war''", they objected to the policy because it m'educes "Wallace attributes this anomaly (a negative gap) to the war years.
See Wallace (1945), p. 10, Technically, the negative gap occurs because Wallace does not define the labor force as the sum of employed and unemployed workers. "Some suggested that the New Deal legislation ot this period had discouraged private investment and contributed to the severity and length of the Depression. 
"Assuring Full Employment in a Free Competitive Economy, Minority
Views (1945), p.S.
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unemployment in the short run by moving it to the long nm and does so at the cost of higher-inflation."
The sponsor-s of the bill conceded this point but at-gued that the r-esulting inflation worrld lie insignilicant in comparison to a n'eturn to high levels of unemploymnent and the social unrest that would inevitably follow in its wake.
.iIiipOO 'SIhW F"i.n'ecasting .:Icnl, , ~l1t:o? The bill required the president to estimate the number' of jobs necessary for-full employment, the value of pr'oduction consistent with full employment, and the value of pr'oduction that would occur' in the absence of any new federal compensatory spending program. tn the opinion of the opponents, successfully completing such a task 16 to 18 months in advance of the events was virtually impossible. 'they pointed out that the estimates would depend on the prevailing price level, the kinds of goods (and hence, jobsi making up aggregate production, and average wage rates. They asked Congress to consider' "how wrong any estimate for-1930 would have been, if made in 1929."
The defense mustered against this criticism was that the bill required forecasts based on "current trends" in the data. Opponents pointed out that maintairiing con tinuous ftrll employment r-equired the discovery of deviations from trend as well as breaks in the trend before they occurred. Extrapolating current trends would not do the job.
No provision of the bill received more attention during the debates than section 2 lb-cl, which extended to all able Americans the right to an oppor-tunity for full-time employment. Extending this right meant that the federal gover-nment wotrld become responsible for-assuring that enough jobs were avail-NOVEMBER 19811.
able." Opponents objected to this provision because: lIthe bill made no pr-ovision for enfon-cing the might; 21 it would lead people to expect more than the gover-nmont could possibly deliver; and 3) the provision is socialistic and alien to the basic principles of the United States."
During the debates, suppon1er-s conceded that, "the statutory enunciation of the night to an oppor-tunity for ernploymnent does not imply redress thr-ough the courts"' Rather, people who believed they were prevented from exercising this right could petition the government to impr-ove its econoriric polkw or obtain a change in government through the r-egular-ejection process Opponents argued that the inclusion of this right in the bill, at best, extended an empty promise to the electorate and led them to expect more than the government was willing or able to deliver. Al worst, any attempt to enforce the right would be incompatible with the fundamental objective of the bill as well as with democratic institutions."
SON IL' IMP( R'IAN".i" CHANGES
The debates resulted in significant changes between the bill as it was initially nepor1ed and the legislation that was finally ena~tedby Congress (see shaded insert on the next page). For example, amendments succeeded in eliminating the declaration of the right to an employment opportunity, the feden'al government's respomisibiity to assure continuing full employment, and the requirement to submit a budget based on the pr'inciple of compensatory finance. In particular, section 2 of the final version states that it is the intention "of the Federal Government ---to promote maximum employment, pr'oduction, and pun'-chasing power." Thus, the actual legislation is a state-"Of course, scarcity assures everyone of a job at a sufficiently low wage. The rub came because the wage considered to be "remunerative" was $2,000 per year which was the average annual income of private nonagricultural workers at that time. "As the Kipllnger Washington Letter once noted, "Jobs for everyone able and willing to work leaves out a lot of people." (1945) , p.
"Assuring Full Employment in a Free Competitive Economy
"Assuring Full Employment in a Free Competitive Economy, Minority
Views (1945), pp. 4-5, 27. This criticism was discounted by Sen. Thomas of Utah, a spokesman for the bill. He reminded detractors "that the basic difference between the American constitutional concept (and totalitarian regimes) -. . is that in America we have all the time the welfare of the individual person in mind." The senator's argument calls to mind Daniel Webster's observation that "There are men in all ages who mean to govern well, but they mean to govern. They promise to be good masters, but they mean to be masters."
"Ibid., p.5. "The adoption of such a policy (compensatory spending), -. . , would result in continued Federal spending over many years, causing an inflation of prices and an artificial boom, and then the very depression and unemployment we are trying to avoid." "Ibid., p. 3. One of the most forceful criticisms of the forecasting requirements was presented during the public hearings by Elisha M. 'the 1976 hilt resurrected ''the right of all adult Amner'icans able, willing, and seeking won-k to oppor-tumuties for-useftrl paid employment at fair rates of compensation.'' It requim'ed the president to establish ''annual numerical goals for-employment pr-oduction, arid purchasing power and to submit a budget containing a ''level and composition of Federal expenditun'es, measured against estimated capabilities at full employment and production, necessany to support the annual economic goals proposed in section 3 and to support the Full Emnplovmuent and Balanced Growth Plan ...''~' In addition to this con-c, the bill°F uIlEmployment and Balanced Growth Act of 1976, pp. 7-10, and 15. contained provisions n-egar-ding the coor'dination of monetary and fiscal policies, economy in goven'nmnent, anti-inflation polic, regional employment policy, youth employment policy~tnd income maintenance; it also established an Advisor-v Committee on Full Employment and Economic GrowtL."
The legislative process was less kind to the 1976 hill than it was to its 1945 forerunner, One critic of the hill remar-ked that the seedling of the unemployment goal had grown ml to an 'unmanageable Christmas tn-ce,'' ani ''unwor'kahle monster' that deserved to he chopped down. 't'he hill was debated for-more than two year-s and, like its for-el-unmet', was stripped of its substantive provisions when President Carter signed it on October' 27, 1978 lsee the shaded inset't on the next page for' the main provisions of the. Full Employment and Balatmced Gn)wth Act of 1978). comment of Raymond Moley's regarding the proliferation of conflicting goals in some New Deal legislation seems perlinent at this point. Moley wrote that "to look upon these policies as the result of a unified plan was to believe that the accumulation of stuffed snakes, baseball pictures, school flags, old tennis shoes, geometry books, and chemistry sets in a boy's bedroom could have been put there by an interior decorator." Moley (1939) .
